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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
RUDY DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

case No. 14703

APPELIANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case

wherei~

the appellant appeals

from a conviction of aggravated assault.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter came before the Honorable Edward Sbeya:
Judge of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for

Ca~n
).'.

~

County, for trial, sitting with a jury, on June 22, 1976. ·-on
June 23, 1976, after closing arguments, the jury retired to
deliberate and returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty
of aggravated assault.

Stand-by counsel for defendant requested

a pre-sentence report and the matter was set for sentencing
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on July 12, 1976, at which time the court sentenced defendant
to a term of not to exceed five years at the State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction
because (1) The trial court denied appellant's constitutional
right to a fair trial wheri it permitted appellant to represent
himself, because he had insufficient time to prepare his defense and also because he was not mentally competent; and (2)
The trial court committed reversible error by failing to properly instruct the jury on the defense of insanity.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the evening of February 29, 1976, appellant
and Joe Albert Valdez were at the No Name Bar, previously
known as the White Star, drinking beer with their respective

friends (Tr. 6).

Appellant and Valdez got into a verbal

argument, Valdez struck appellant, and a fight ensued with
Valdez knocking appellant to the ground (Tr. 7, 13): but
friends soon stopped the fight (Tr. 17).

Shortly thereafter

Valdez left the bar (Tr. 7), and minutes later appellant also
left the bar (Tr. 17).

Appoximately 45 minutes later Valdez

returned to the bar (Tr. 8).

Shortly thereafter appellant

also return~d, entering through a doorway with a knife in
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his hand and walking over to Valdez and swinging once at him
with the knife, cutting him under tne right eye (Tr. 8, 18).
On March 18, 1976, appellant appeared before the
Price City Court for arraignment and counsel on appeal was
appointed as appellant's defense counsel (R 2).

On April 5,

1976, appellant appeared before the District court for
arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty (District court
Minute Entries).

On April 15, 1976, appellant's counsel

filed with the District court a Notice that appellant intended to assert the defense of insanity at his trial (R 11).
The court, on May 10, 1976, appointed two alienists to examine
appellant and investigage into his sanity, and on June 2,
1976, the court vacated its May 10 order appointing: alienist
and appointed two other alienists (R 12, 13) •

On June 21,

1976, the day before trial, appellant requested the court
to release his court appointed counsel and allow appellant
to represent himself at trial without the assistance of
counsel.

The trial court granted appellant's request, ordering

.i

the release of his legal counsel and permitting appellant to
represent himself as attorney pro se and further ordering that
the same legal counsel act as appellant's Stand-By counsel
at the trial (District court Minute Entries).

On June 22,

1976, the day of the trial, the court conducted a special hearing, advising appellant as to the procedures to be followed_
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in representing himself at the trial and ordering that the
Court was satisfied that the defendant voluntarily waived
his right to legal counsel and that appellant could represent
himself at the trial and further ordering that appellant's
previously appointed legal counsel be appointed as stand-By
counsel to be present at the counsel table with appellant
(District court Minute Entries) •
At the conclusion of the special hearing appellant's
trial commenced.

Appellant, acting as attorney pro se, con-

ducted all of the cross-examination of the State's eight
witnesses.

During the presentation of the State's case,

appellant's Stand-By counsel occasionally made, on behalf
of appellant, objections to the introduction of certain
evidence, and on other occasions requested of the court that
he be allowed to confer with appellant before appellant continued with his cross-examination of the State's witnesses
(Tr. 5, 9, 12, 14, 15, 24, 28, 30, 37, 39, 42, 47, 75, 77).

At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant presented
his case, consisting of one witness--one of the two Court
appointed alienists.

Inunediately prior to direct examination

of his sole witness appellant made the court and Stand-By
counsel aware of the fact that he could not read, and StandBy counsel therefore requested of the court that he be allowed
to conduct the direct examination of the expert witness
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(Tr. 57).

After the State cross-examined, appellant con-

ducted re-direct examination.

(Tr. 72).

At the conclusion

of the presentation of evidence, both appellant and his
Stand-By counsel presented closing arguments to the jury
(Tr. 88).

After the jury retired for their deliberations,

appellant's Stand-By counsel took exception to Jury Instruction No. 4 pertaining to the defense of insanity (Tr. 88).
The jury reached a verdict, finding the defendant guilty of
aggravated assault (Tr. 88).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELIAlff' S C~"" ·>.:~'i.'
TUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, AND OTHERWISE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROil, WHEN D'
PERMITTED DEFENMNT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF
AT HIS TRIAL, BECAUSE HE HAD I.:NSUFFlClEft·. · .-. : -'
TIME IN WHICH TO PREPARE HIS DEFENSE AND
ALSO BECAUSE HE WAS NOT MENTALLY COMR'fEa. e.-u

constitutionally, legislatively, and judiciall:Jl!f":.r':i
Utah has recognized that a defendant in criminal prosecu-..:.,,_.e_,
tions has the right to

~epresent

himself.

constitution of

Utah, Art. 1, Sec. 12; Utah code Annotated, 77-1-8 (l)
(1953); state vs Penderville, infra.

The United States Supreme

Court has recently held the same right of self representation
to be applicable through the 14th Ammendment to those States
which have not passed a constitutional amendment

or statute
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giving a defendant a right of self representation.
vs California, infra.

Faretta

However, in order to afford the

criminal defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial,
the judiciary has qualified the defendant's constitutional
right of self representation by requiring that the criminal
defendant desiring to represent himself be sui juris and
not·mentally incompetent.

The Utah Supreme court made such

a qualification in State vs Penderville, 2 U. 2d 281, 272 P.
2d 195 (1954).

Therein, defendant Penderville appealed his

conviction of murder in the second degree on the ground,
~.

~

that the trial court committed reversible error in

refusing to permit the defendant to conduct his own defense.
The court agreed with the defendant,_ holding that .the trial
court erred in denying defendant his right to try his case
without the aid of counsel.

However, during the course of

the opinion the court qualified a criminal defendant's right
under Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah constitution to conduct his own defense:
It is generally, if not universally held that
the accused in a criminal proceeding who is
sui juris and not mentally incompetent has
the right to conduct his own defense without
the aid of counsel. 272 P. 2d at 199.
(emphasis added)
The United states Supreme court in Faretta vs California, 422

u.

s. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 s. ct. 2525 (1975), made the

same qualification to its holding that a criminal defendant
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in state cases has a 6th and 14th ammendment right to conduct
his own defense without the assistance of counsel:
When an accused manages his own defense he
relinquishes, as a purely factual matte~,
many of the traditional benefits associated
with the right to counsel. For this reason,
in order to represent himself, the accused
must knowingly and intelligently forego those
relinquished benefits. Although a defendant
need not himself have the skill and experience
of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self representation, he should
be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self representation, so that the
record will establish that "he knows what he
is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open". Here, weeks before trial, Faretta
- clearly and unequivocally declared to.the trial
Judge that he wanted to represent himself
and did not want counsel. The record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, ocnapetent, and understanding, and.that he was
voluntarily exercising his informed f;r;ee wi.1.'L.t
45 L. Ed. 2d at 581-582.
Reference is also made to 21 Am. Jur. 2d,. CRIMINAL IAW, Section
310 at 335:
'

..

Thus, if he is sui juris and mentally competent,
an accused may conduct his defense in pe.-s~
without the assistance of counsel, where he
elects to do so in full knowledge and undexstanding of the risks involved.
In the instant case it is appellant's contention
that the lower court denied his constitutional right to a
fair trial and otherwise committed reversible error by granting
his request to release his court appointed legal counsel and
to allow him to conduct his own defense at trial.

Appellant
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grounds his contention on the following three facts:
1.

Appellant's request to act as attorney pro se,

and the court's Order of the same, were made only one day
prior to the trial and therefore didn't give appellant sufficient time in which to prepare his defense.

As disclosed

by the District Court's Minute Entries contained in the record
on appeal, appellant requested of the court on June 21, 1976,
that he be allowed to represent himself at his trial and that
his court appointed legal counsel be released from further
representation.

On that same day the District court ordered

that appellant be allowed to conduct his own defense and that
his court appointed legal counsel be released but that he
act as Stand-By counsel at the trial and sit at the counsel
table with appellant to advise him on matters as the trial
proceeded.

Appellant's trial began the following day (Tr.

Title Page, District court Minute Entries).

Therefore, at

best appellant had 24 hours in which to prepare for his trial.
Such a short time period would be entirely insufficient for
the best of legal counsel, let alone one such as appellant
who is not schooled in the law.

Although not directly on

point, Utah code Annotated, Section 77-24-18 (1953) requires
that defendant be allowed at least two days to prepare for
trial after making his plea.

Also, compare the criminal

defendant's time situation in Faretta vs California, supra,
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with that of appellant's:
Here, weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and
unequivocally declared to the trial Judge that
he wanted to represent himself and did not
want counsel. 45 L. Ed. 2d at 582. (emphasis
added) •
2.

Appellant was partially illiterate in that he

could not read and therefore was not mentally competent to
prepare and conduct his own defense.

Even assuming that

appellant could adequately prepare for trial within a 24 hour
period, to do so would require that appellant have the abilit_y
to read over the pleadings and research out statutory.
visions and judicial opinions.

,.,

-:

However, appellant did not
.~ .. ~~

.;o,

possess the ability to read.

pr~_

..
-~

·~t..!f"'4"'

l

The trial court and Stand-ey counsel
. '·. '. .•. '. -:.:t

were first made aware at a very late stage of the trial.proceeding that defendant could not read and therefore could
t:

not conduct the direct examination of his expert witness
I'-,-~•·
(Tr. 57).

t19

l

,!~b

It re-quires little imagination for one to
conclude
' ·.·,
,,,..,-3 :ton

that without the ability to read, appellant

coul~

not effect·~!~!

ively prepare to meet the State's charge that he c~it~!~~
the offense of aggravated assault, or effectively
his defense of insanity.

pre~e

,,

,Qla~

Again, compare defendant's_s1tuat~an
. • ' ,.~.... :J

in Faretta vs California, supra, where the trial court determined, prior to trial, that Faretta was literate:
The record shows that Faretta was lite£ate,
competent, and understanding, and that1\e
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was voluntarily exercising his informed free
,!£.

will.

3.

Within the prescribed statutory

p~riod

after

district court arraignment and long before appellant requested
that he be allowed to represent himself, appellant entered
the defense of insanity.

On April 5, 1976, appellant appeared

before the district court for arraignment and entered a plea
of not guilty (District court Minute Entries) •

On April 15,

1976, appellant gave notice that he was intending to assert
the defense of insanity at his trial (R 11).

On June 21,

1976, appellant requested of the Court, and the Court granted
his request, to represent himself at trial.

On June 22nd

trial began (District court Minute Entries).
counsel is well aware that when a criminal defendant
enters the defense of insanity that defense puts in issue the
defendant's sanity at the time of the proscribed conduct,
not the defendant's sanity at the time of psychiatric examination or at the time of trial.

Utah Code Annotated, Sec.

76-2-305 (1953 as amended): State vs Gleason, 17
P. 2d 793 (1965).
contend otherwise.

u.

2d 150, 405

Appellant in the instant case does not
Rather, appellant contends first that by

virtue of the trial court permitting the appellant to conduct his own defense at trial appellant's defense of insanity
lost its credibility in the eyes of the jury.

Stated otherwise,
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a juror's reaction might very well be to conclude that for
the trial judge to permit appellant to represent himself at
trial implies that the trial judge is of the opinion that
appellant has full control of his mental faculties and is
legally sane, and therefore appellant's defense that he is
not guilty by reason of insanity is entirely without merit.
Again, counsel recognizes that a criminal defendant might
very well be legally insane at the time he conunitted the
offense but be in full control of his mental faculties and
legally sane at the time of his trial.

However, this begs

the question as to whether jurors can draw the same distinction
under these peculiar circumstances of a defendant who has
entered a defense of insanity, yet who has been permitted to
conduct his own defense.
Second, to be denied the contitUtional right to
represent hi.11.Self, a criminal defendant need not be proved
legally insane; rather, it need only be established that he
is mentally incompetent.

Yet, the connection between possible

legal insanity at the time of the proscribed conduct and mental
incompetency at the time of trial comes because the defense
of insanity contains overtones that the criminal defendant
is mentally ill or incompetent,

although not to the point of

insanity, at the time of trial.

Such was the reasoning of
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the federal district court for Tennessee in United states vs
~

260 F. Supp. 1009 (E. D. Tenn. 1966).

Therein, defen-

dant Davis moved for a new trial after a conviction of kidnapping, on the ground, inter alia, that the court erred in
refusing defendant's request to conduct his own defense unassisted by legal counsel.

The court disagreed with the

defendant, holding that defendant was not mentally competent
to conduct his own defense:

In this case, defendant is a college graduate,
having a bachelors degree from the University
of Chattanooga, with a major in Business Administration. He has an agile mind, and is
articulate. However, prior to the trial, and
at the time of the trial, there was considerable ,
evidence that defendant was at least emotionally
disturbed. • • • It was generally agreed that
defendant's disturbance took the form of schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type, manifested
by inappropriate thinking, grandiose delusions,
etc • • • • An important factor in capacity to
be tried is the defendant's mental ability
to render his counsel such assistance to make
possible a proper defense • • • • On the other
hand, it is vital to defense pro se, that one
be able to recognize proper defenses and
evidence to support them and to be able to
discard the irrelevant. The distinction
between capacity to stand trial and capacity
to defend pro se has been recognized by the
supreme Court. In the case of Massey vs
Moore 384 u. s. 105, 75 s. ct. 145, 99 L. Ed.
"ffi(l954), the court held: "One might not
be insane in the sense of being incapable of
standing trial and yet lack the capacity to
stand trial without benefit of counsel."
Further 1 the defense in the instant case was
that of temporary insanity. There was little
if any dispute as to the acts constituting
the offenses with which defendant was charged.
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Alt~ough defendan~'s

plea was temporary insanity, such a derense has overtones of mental
illness which mig:1t carry into the time of
trial. It is appropriate to note the remark
of Justice Douglas in Massey vs Moore, supra,
that: "If he is insane, his need of a lawyer
to tender the defense is too plain for argument," though that case was concerned with
allegations of insanity at the time of trial.
The court is of the opinion that defendant,
although having the capacity to stand trial,
was not capable of representing himself and
conducting his own defense. 260 F. Supp. at
1020 and 1021.

Although appellant is arguing the reverse, i. e.
that he should not have been allowed to represent himself,
the end result should be the same:

Appellant shouldn't have

been able to represent himself because he asserted the defense of insanity and the assertion of such a defense and
presentation of evidence at trial to that effect sufficient
to overcome the presumption of sanity has overtones that
appellant suffered from mental illness at the time of trial
and that such mental illness, even if falling short of leqal
insanity at the time of trial, would still constitute mental
incompetence.

As in United States vs Davis, supra, evidence

was presented at trial in the instant case regarding mental
illness defendant suffered from at the time of trial.

On

appellant's redirect examination of Dr. Chicadus, appellant's
sole defense witness, the following colloquy took place between himself and Dr. Chicadus (Tr. 73):
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Q.

Yes Sir. Would you call it a mental disease
that I have?

A.

A mental illness, yes.

Q.

I do have a mental illness in your opinion?

A.

In my opinion.

Q.

Was this, a lack of education?

A.

No.

Q.

Would you classify it as lacking communication with society?

A.

Not really.

Q.

How would you classify it?

A.

Well, it has to do with the responses that
you gave in the mental status examination.
And it is to do with the ability to abstract.
To be able to coqnizant of things. To give
reality. To respond to factual questions.

Lacking the ability to perceive reality and to be coqnizant of
his surroundings, the question must be asked seriously whether
appellant was mentally competent to conduct his own defense at
trial.
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS IBLE ERROR BY
FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY.
At appellant's trial, the lower court gave the following jury instruction, titled Instruction No. 4 (R 22, 23):
I instruct you that the issue of whether the
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Defendant was sane or insane at the time he
is alleged to have committed the offense
charged in the Information has been raised by
the evidence in this case. Whether one is
sane or insane at said time is a question of
fact for you to determine.
Insanity is an element in determining questions
of guilt of or punishment for crime only when
it renders the person so affected irresponsible
or partly irresponsible. That is, the Defendant
cannot be convicted of the crime charged, if,
at the time of the act, he was insane to such
an extent that he did not know the nature of
the act; that is, did not know he had a knife,
or that if he used it on Joe Albert Valdez,
it may injure Mr. Valdez: or that, when he
wielded the knife against the"person of Mr.
Valdez, he did not know it was wrong in the
sense that such act was condemned by mm.tale u
law; or that he was unable, by reason of mental
disease, to control his actions or impulses
to injure Joe Albert Valdez.
If you find from all of the evidence in this
case beyond a reasonable doubt that the ne-: "
fendant cut Joe Albert Valdez with a knife,
and that said knife was a deadly weapen,,, &ml"'
if you further find that at the time of this
act that Defendant knew the nature of the aicS
and knew that wielding a knife and striking Mr.
Valdez with the same may injure Mr. Valdes*
y
and if you further find that Defendant knew
it was wrong to wield said knife in the sense
that such act was condemned by morals or liar
and that at said time he was not suffering fraa
mental disease and could have controlled b.is'· · ·
actions or impulses to injure Mr. Valdez, tAen
you should find the Defendant guilty as charged
in the Information.
on the other hand, if you find from all of t:Ae
evidence in this case that the Defendant at
the time of wielding said knife and cutting
Mr. Valdez, he was insane to such an extent
that he did not know the nature of the act:
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that is, did not know he had a knife or that
if he wielded it and struck Mr. Valdez with it
it may injure Mr. Valdez; or that when he
'
struck Mr. Valdez with the knife he did not
kn0\>1 it was wrong in the sense that such act
was condemned by morals or law; or that he was
unable, by reason of mental disease, to control
his actions or impulses to injure Mr. Valdez
or if you entertain a reasonable doubt as to'
Defendant's insanity in doing the acts l1eretofore particularly mentioned, then you shall
find the Defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity.
You are further instructed that the terms
"mental disease" or "insanity" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
After the jury retired for deliberation, appellant's StandBy counsel excepted to the above jury instruction

(Tr~

SS) on

the ground that it did not accurately reflect the definition
and defense of insanity as set forth in Utah code Annotated,
Section 76-2-305 (1953 as amended):
(l)

In any prosecution for an offense, it shall

be a defense that the defendant, at the time

of the proscribed conduct, as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this section, the terms mental
disease or defect do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
On appeal here, it is appellant's contention that the above
quoted jury instruction used by the lower court at his trial
is taken from Utah supreme court opinions prior in time to
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the State Legislature's adoption of Section 76-2-305, supra 1
that Section 76-2-305 sets forth a legal test of insanity
different from that contained in the trial court's jury instruction and the Utah Supreme Court opinions from which it came 1
that Section 76-2-305 supersedes and overrules the judicial
opinions prior in time to it, and consequently the jury at
appellant's trial was not instructed on the proper and applicable Utah law relating to the defense of insanity1 and
therefore the trial Court committed reversible error.
Such contentions necessitate review of the Utah
case law and comparison of it to Section 76-2-305.

In

~

vs Hadley 234 P. 940 (Utah 1925), the Utah supreme court
affirmed defendant Hadley's conviction of the offense of
carnal knowledge, disagreeing with defendant that the trial
court committed error in instructing the jury on the defense
of insanity.

During the course of the opinion, the court gave

its approval to the trial court's jury instruction on insanity:
The court further instructed the Jury that
insanity or mental unsoundness must be of such
degree as to leave the accused in such a
mental state as to deprive hiln of the capacity
to understand that the act conuuitted constituted an offense and was wrong. These instructions fairly defined the law governing
the rights of the accused upon a defense based
upon insanity or lack of mental ability. 234
P. at 942.
In State vs Green, 78

u.

580, 6 P. 2d 177 (1931)1 and 86

·u.
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192, 40 P. 2d 961 (1935), Utah's highest court again addressed
the issue of the legal test for insanity.

Therein, the court

set forth the following as an accurate statement of the law
to be incorporated into jury instructions:
Assuming that the jury in this case found
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant shot and killed James
Green as charged in the Information, he would
be entitled to an acquittal if at that time
he was, as a matter of fact, insane to such
an extent that he either (1) did not know the
nature of his act, that is, did not know that
he had a revolver, that it may be loaded, and
that, if discharged at or towards James Green,
it would probably injure or kill him; or (2)
that when he fired the shot he did not know
it was wrong in the sense that such act was
condemned by morals or law; (3) that he was
unable by reason of his mental disease to
control his actions or impulses to injure or
kill James Green. If the defendant was
afflicted with a disease of the mind at the
time of the alleged offense in any one or
more of the three manners and to the extent
indicated, then and in such case he was not
legally responsible. 6 P. 2d at 184.
A comparison of the above quoted

lang~age

with that used by

the lower court in Jury Instruction No. 4, supra, in the instant case will reveal that the lower court incorporated
verbatim most of the language contained above into Instruction
No. 4.
The next case heard by the Utah Supreme court
F

regarding the defense of insanity was that of State vs Kirkham
7

u.

2d 108, 319 P. 2d 859 (1958) and therein the court approved
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the jury instruction set forth in State vs Green, supra, once
again and noted that it constituted a combination of the
McNaghten test and the irresistable impulse test.
2d at 861.

319 P.

The combination test set forth in State vs

Green, supra, and reaffirmed in State vs Kirkham, supra, was
the subject of attack in State vs Poulson, 14
P. 2d 93 (1963).

u.

2d 213, 381

Defendant Poulson appealed his conviction

of murder in the first degree on the ground, inter alia,
that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the
defense of insanity under either the so called "Durham Rule 0
.~.

or the American Law Institute's proposed rule, rather t'ban
the combination test set forth in State vs Green.

~

W··>.

'l'he Supr._

court of Utah disagreed with the defendant, holding:
'

- ··$!1-

The Instruction, as given by the lower c~tt< ,r,1
embodies both the McNaghten Rule and ~ sqr 'c
called •irresistable impulse" test. Such an
instruction adequately protected the inte~\11
of the defendant, and we are not persuaded to
adopt in lieu thereof either the Dm'• ~1@ 1 6
or the rule proposed by the A. L. I." 381 P.
2d at 95.
·
The court's reaffirmation in State vs Pgu1son of._t;Jae
combination McNaghten-irresistable impulse tests initiall.J.·.·,:
promulgated in State vs Green, supra, and the accompaJ:1.ying ,,_;,
rejection of the American Law Institute's "substantial capacity''
test must now give way to Section 76-2-305, supra, which adapts
the American Law Institute's test verbatim.

The following
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constitutes the American Law Institute's Rule on insanity
as set forth in the Model Penal Code, Section 401, (1962
Proposed Official Draft):
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substant~al capacity either to appreciate the
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms mental
disease or defect do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. ·
Granted, the A. L. I. Rule as set forth in 76-2-305,
supra, sets forth what appears to be a combination test of the
McNaghten Rule and the irresistable impulse test; however,
section 76-2-305 goes one step further and is much broader in
statement and concept in that it only requires a lack of
"substantial capacity".

.In contrast, both the McNaghten Rule

and the irresistable impulse test require the complete lack
of capacity.

In addition, the A. L. I. Rule and Section

76-2-305 are broader in scope and definition as to what
constitutes insanity in that it only requires defendant to
lack substantial capacity to "appreciate" the wrongfulness
of his conduct, whereas the McNaghten Rule requires defendant
to lack complete ability to "know" his conduct is wrong.

A

well drafted statement of the difference between the A. L. I.
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test and the McNaghten and irresistable impulse tests is set
fort!l in CRIMINAL LAW, Wayne R. LaFave and Austin

w. Scott,

Jr., West Publishing Co., Hornbook Series, 1972, Section 38
at 293:
Most significant is the fact that the A. L. I.
test only requires a lack of "substantial
capacity". This is clearly a departure from
the usual interpretation of McNaghten and
irresistable impulse, whereby a complete impairment of cognitive capacity and capacity
for self-control is necessary. Substantial
capacity, the draftsmen noted, is all "that
candid witnesses, called on to infer the
nature of the situation at a time that they
did not observe, can ever confidently say,
even when they know that a disorder was extreme."
Moreover, even if witnesses could be more
specific, it is undoubtedly true that there are
many cases of advanced mental disorder in which
rudimentary capacities of cognition and volition
exist but which clearly present inappropriate
occasions for the application of criminal sanctions. The draftsmen acknowledged that the word
"substantial" imputes no specific measure of
degree, but concluded that identifying the
degree of impairment with precision was "impossible both verbally and logically."
The A. L. I. test uses the word "appreciate"
instead of "know," a term which has been responsible for much of the criticism and misunderstanding of McNaghten. It thus seems
apparent that expert testimony concerning the
emotional or affective aspects of the defendant's personality is clearly relevant on this
aspect of the A. L. I. formulation. As to the
"conform" part of the test, it avoids the
implication (often drawn from the irresistible
impulse test) that the loss of volitional
capacity can be reflected only in
sudden or spontaneous acts as distinguished .
from those accompanied by brooding or reflection.
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As a comparison of the McNaghten-irresistible
impulse tests and the A. L. !.-Section 76-2-305 test reveals,
they differ markedly from one another.

Therefore, failure

on the part of the trial court to include in its Jury Instruction No. 4 the language set forth in Section 76-2-305 (1)
prevented the jury from applying the correct Utah law on the
defense of, insanity, as adopted by the Utah State Legislature,
to the facts of the case as presented through testimony at
trial.

This constitutes reversible error.
CONCLUSION
The appellant was denied his constitutional right

to a fair trial, and the trial court otherwise committed
reversible error, when it permitted appellant to represent
himself at trial, because he did not have sufficient time
in which to prepare for trial,. and because he was not mentally
competent to conduct his own defense in view of his illiteracy, his mental illness at the time of trial, and his assertion of the defense of insanity.
The trial court also committed error because it
failed to properly instruct the jury on the defense of insanity in that the court's jury instruction contained the
combination McNaghten-irresistable impulse rules as set forth
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in State vs Green rather than instructing on the defense of
insanity as set forth in 76-2-305.
Therefore, the appellant's conviction and sentence
by the lower court should be reversed.
MTED this

JP./ if

day of October, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL R. JENSEN

Frandsen and Keller
Professional Building
90 West First North
Price, Utah
84501
Attorneys for Appellant

By::tJ;}~d
R.

NSEN

r·

CERTIFJ:CATE OF SERVICE
J: hereby certify that the foregoing Appellant's
Brief was served on counsel for the respondent, Vernon B.
Romney, Utah State Attorney General, by delivering three (3)
copies thereof to his office at 236 State capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114 on

the.~~~-day

of October,

1976.
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